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THE ECHO OF CLARENCE GIDEON'S TRUMPET

THE ECHO OF CLARENCE GIDEON'S TRUMPET
James A. Lake, Sr.*
The question is very simple. I requested the
court to appoint me attorney and the court refused.'
With these words Clarence Earl Gideon, unaided by counsel,
outlined his contention for the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. Counsel could not have improved upon the succinctness of this formulation. The facts of Mr. Gideon's case and the
rule laid down by the Court are simple: The conviction of a person tried in a state court upon a felony charge is not valid unless
he is represented by counsel, if the accused does not validly waive
this right. But many difficulties lurk behind the simple question
posed by Mr. Gideon -and the narrow answer given by the Court.
The echoes of the decision will reverberate to all corners of the
nation for some' time to come. The importance to Nebraska of
the decision, and its echoes, are the theme of this article.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN NEBRASKA STATE COURTS
During the reign of Betts v. Brady,2 persons unable to hire
their own counsel could be validly convicted of felony charges in
some states even though their request that they. be aided by an
attorney went unanswered. Betts held the United States Constitution was violated only if special circumstances showing unfairness were present and state law in these jurisdictions did not
provide counsel. Nebraska was not one of these. In other words,
had Clarence Gideon been tried by the State of Nebraska, instead
of by Florida, he would not have been forced to act as his own
lawyer. He would have been furnished a lawyer (either one
appointed by the court or a public defender), and in either case
the attorney would have been compensated from county funds.3
From '1873 to .the present, Gideon would have been thus
treated in Nebraska, for in 1873 the Nebraska Legislature enacted:
The court before whom any person shall be indicted for any
- *

Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.

1 Reply of Petitioner to Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari,

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), quoted in LEwis, GIDEoN's
TRUmPET 38

(1964).

2 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
a NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1803 (Reissue 1964) (appointed counsel); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 28-1804 (Reissue 1964) (public defender).
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offense which is capital, or punished by imprisonment in the
penitentiary, is hereby authorized and required to assign to such
person counsel not exceeding two, if the prisoner has not the
ability to procure counsel . . ; and it shall not be lawful for
... any county . . . to . . . allow an account . . . presented by
an attorney ... for services performed ... until said account
. . . shall have been . . . allowed by the court . . .:
Provided,
That no such account . . . shall in any
case except in cases of
4
homicide, exceed one hundred dollars.
Until a recent enactment this was the law of Nebraska except
that the 100 dollars ceiling in nonhomicide cases was raised to 300
dollars, 5 and in 1957 the Legislature added the following provision
applicable to capital punishment cases:
In cases ...
when the punishment is capital and the person
convicted is not represented by counsel of his own choosing, the
judge who presided at the trial shall assign to such person
counsel, not exceeding two, to represent such person before the
Supreme Court. . . . For services rendered ... in the Supreme
Court, counsel shall be allowed a reasonable fee, in such amount
as the district court shall allow . . . which . . . shall be in addition to the amount allowed for representing such person during
trial. 6

Section 11 of Article I of the 1875 Nebraska Constitution provided:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person or by counsel ....

This language has not been changed by amendment to date. 7
The fact that for the past ninety years Gideon would have
received what he asked for because of Nebraska law, without resorting to the federal constitution, does not mean that his case
Neb. Gen. Stat. ch. 58, § 437 (1873).
5 Neb. Laws ch. 104, § 1 (1957).
6 Neb. Laws ch. 107, § 6 (1957).
7 The constitution approved February 9, 1866, which served from statehood to November 1, 1875, provided in art. I, § 7: "In all criminal
prosecutions and in cases involving the life or liberty of an individual,
the accused shall have a right . .. to have the assistance of counsel."
A proposal in the 1919-20 constitutional convention sought to
guarantee counsel "in all criminal prosecutions, including prosecutions
before police magistrates . . . .'
I PROcEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITuTIONAL CONvENTIoN, 1919-20, at 597-98.
(Emphasis added.) Considerable discussion ensued over the proposal to add the words italicized
above, but no change was made by the convention. Id. at 598-622.
Arguments against the proposal were (1) that it would prove so time
consuming that police courts would be unable to keep abreast of their
dockets, particularly in Omaha, and (2) that it was unfair and discriminatory to guarantee counsel in "police magistrate" courts and
deny counsel in cases before justices of the peace.
4
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and its progeny, some yet unborn, have, and will have, no impact
here. Nor does it mean that all the problems involved in furnishing counsel to indigents have been solved.
Prior to the passage of a recent bill by the Legislature," an
indigent's right to counsel in the Nebraska state courts was as
follows: In all felony prosecutions, indigents were entitled to be
represented at their trial by either a public defender or by a court
appointed attorney. In the vast majority of cases, the attorney
was provided after the information charging a felony was filed
and before the indigent pleaded to the charge. 9 Appointment at a
later date than this would certainly run a grave risk of failing to
stand a challenge under the fourteenth amendment of the federal
constitution. 10 Indigents charged with misdemeanors were not
provided counsel either at their trial or for appellate review;"
nor did existing law provide for counsel at the preliminary hear12
ing, even for felony charges.
Counsel appointed in nonhomicide cases were paid a fee for
their services, but the statute limited the fee to a 300 dollar maximum. The claim must have been examined, allowed, and certified
by the trial court before the county could pay it. While the fee
thus judicially certified was not binding upon the county governing board, 13 "it has been the custom to audit and pay such claims
when certified and allowed by the trial judge."' 4 In homicide
cases there was no statutory ceiling.
In capital punishment cases, the language added to the statute
in 1957, and quoted above, guaranteed an indigent counsel for his
review in the Nebraska Supreme Court, and the same language
clearly authorized the district court to award an additional fee for
counsel's services in the supreme court.
In noncapital punishment cases, the indigent was provided
counsel for supreme court representation, but the right rested upon
8 L.B.

839, 75th Neb. Leg. Sess. (May 3, 1965).
9 See State v. Snell, 177 Neb. 396, 128 N.W.2d 823 (1964).
10 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
11 Durfee v. State, 53 Neb. 214, 73 N.W. 676 (1897).
12 State v. O'Kelly, 175 Neb. 798, 124 N.W.2d 211 (1963); Lingo v. Hann,
161 Neb. 67, 71 N.W.2d 716 (1955); Roberts v. State, 145 Neb. 658, 17
N.W.2d 666 (1945); Adams v. State, 138 Neb. 613, 294 N.W. 396 (1940);
Van Buren v. State, 65 Neb. 223, 91 N.W. 201 (1902); Latimer v. State,
55 Neb. 609, 76 N.W. 207 (1898).
Is County of Boone v. Armstrong, 23 Neb. 764, 37 N.W. 626 (1888).
14 Moran v. Otoe County, 95 Neb. 658, 661, 146 N.W. 956, 957 (1914).
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court decisions, not upon a statute. In Moran v. Otoe County,1
an attorney was appointed by the District Court for Otoe County
to represent an indigent charged with felonious assault. The
indigent was convicted, and his court-appointed attorney was
awarded fifty dollars for his services at the trial. The same attorney unsuccessfully sought to reverse the indigent's conviction
by review in the state supreme court. The trial court then
awarded the attorney an additional fifty dollars for his services in
the supreme court, but the county commissioners refused to pay.
The issue was whether the county was "required to pay the
attorney's fee . . . for services in the supreme court .... ." The
court noted that the statute "makes no direct provision for an
allowance for services by an attorney in the supreme court." The
court reaffirmed an earlier ruling that the supreme court itself
Nevertheless, the court held
was without power to order a fee.'
that
[the district] court has the power, which it ought and usually
does exercise, to assign . . . counsel. In such case the attorney,
being an officer of the court, is required to defend the criminal
and accept such compensation, within the limits of the statute,
as the court may allow ....
[T]he trial court should exercise a
reasonable discretion in the allowance of such claims, and if he
should find, on a conviction of the defendant in the district court,
the case is one which should be taken to the supreme court, he
should make an allowance to the 7attorney, within the limit fixed
by the statute, for that purpose.'
When we turn to proceedings other than a criminal trial or
direct review of a criminal conviction, but which nevertheless
affect the liberties of indigent persons, we are met with a curious
patchwork of state policy. A statute provides that if a court
finds that an alleged sexual psychopath is "unable to obtain counsel, it shall appoint counsel for him."'Is There is no provision
for payment of a fee, nor any provision for counsel if the indigent
desires to exercise his right to appeal to the supreme court the
finding that he is a sexual psychopath. An identical, and likewise
ambiguous, provision for counsel exists with reference to alleged
drug users.19 There is no state right to counsel in habeas corpus
or coram
nobis proceedings because they are characterized- as
"civil." 20 However, under a recently enacted statute establishing
15 95 Neb. 658, 146 N.W. 956.
16 Edmonds v. State, 43 Neb. 742, 62 N.W. 199 (1895).
17 Moran v. Otoe County, 95 Neb. 658, 660-61, 146 N.W. 956, 957 (1914).
(Reissue 1964).
18 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2902(2)
19 NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-702(2) (Supp. 1963).
20 See, e.g., Tail v. Olson, 144 Neb. 820, 14 N.W.2d 840 (1944).
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a new post-conviction remedy, we find:
The district court may appoint an attorney or attorneys, not
exceeding two, to represent the prisoners in all proceedings under
the provisions of this act and fix their compensation as provided
in section 29-1803, Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943.21
FINANCING THE INDIGENT'S LEGAL SERVICES
One of the echoes of Clarence Gideon's request that "the court
...
appoint me attorney" is: Who is going to pay for Mr.
Gideon's legal services? This issue faces us whether we provide
Mr. Gideon legal aid under the prodding of the fourteenth amendment, or because state law provides for it. For proceedings in
state courts, the answer is clearly not the federal government
(or more accurately, the federal taxpayers). Within the state we
also may someday face the question of whether the cost should
be a state or a county charge, and in the latter case, which county?
But those issues we are not now canvassing. Let us focus attention upon the more basic issue of whether the financial burden
should rest upon the shoulders of some group other than what, for
want of a better term, we shall call the general taxpaying public.
One "other group" might be the members of the bar who provide
the services either gratuitously or for less than a reasonable fee.
It is obvious from Mr. Kutak's article that some of the burden
of providing legal counsel for federal indigents will remain with
members of the federal bar even under the Criminal Justice Act.
For example, attorneys in federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings, in proceedings to vacate sentences under section 2255 of
title 28 of the United States Code, and in any other proceeding
collateral to the original prosecution, go uncompensated. 22 Likewise, under the Criminal Justice Act members of the bar will
subsidize the program of representation for indigents to the extent
that the monetary ceilings written into the act prevent a full fee
for the attorney.
From 1873 until the passage of L.B. 839, Nebraska statutes
have also contained monetary limitations restricting the compensation of appointed attorneys in nonhomicide cases. Prior to 1957,
the limitation was 100 dollars; then, 300 dollars. Recently, the
author aided the American Bar Foundation in its state-by-state
survey of the indigent's right to counsel in state courts. I am
21

L.B. 836, § 4, 75th Neb. Leg. Sess. (April 12, 1965).

22

See JUDIcIAL CoNFERENcE

OF THE UNTED STATES, REPORT OF THE
COMVlITTEE TO IMPLEMENT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE .AcT OF 1964 (1965)
(hereinafter cited as REPORT).
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grateful to the Foundation for that opportunity and for permission
23
to use data secured in that Nebraska project in this article.
A prime area of investigation in the study was the adequacy
of compensation for appointed attorneys in Nebraska, certainly a
basic problem upon which reasonable men may espouse deeply
felt and differing views. Many, even within the bar, strongly
maintain that attorneys have a "duty" to provide this service
gratuitously; others that attorneys should be paid "something" for
their efforts; and others that the attorney is entitled to be paid a
fee commensurate with what he would charge a moderately wellto-do client for similar services. 24 The Foundation survey did not
seek to ascertain the views of individuals upon this policy issue,
but, probably somewhat ambiguously, asked judges and county
attorneys whether they considered the compensation "adequate." 2
Seventeen judges answered this question: Eleven stated that the
compensation was adequate; one that it was "probably" adequate;
and five characterized the amount as inadequate. Fifty-five county attorneys answered the same question. Thirty-eight considered
the compensation adequate; fifteen did not; one said it "varied";
and one stated that appointed attorneys were "more than adequately" compensated.
23 All future citations to the "Foundation survey" or "survey" will mean

24

the survey of state indigents conducted by the American Bar Foundation for the American Bar Association in 1963. A preliminary report
was made available for the August, 1964 meeting of the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association [see SILVERSTEN, DEFENSE
OF THE POOR IN CRIINAL CASES IN AMERIcAN STATE COURTS, A PRELIMINARY SUMMARY (1964)], and a fuller report, SILvERsTEIN, DEFENSE
OF THE POOR (1965), has been published. Whenever this article refers
to "Preliminary Summary," the preliminary report is meant.
Arguments concerning compensation for appointed attorneys have
ranged over many other areas. For example, it has been argued that
uncompensated counsel do not meet the requirement of the federal

constitution. See Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet
the Constitutional Mandate, 49 A.B.A.J. 435 (1963). See also Fellman,
The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REV.
559, 596 (1951). And one court held an attorney appointed by a federal court in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958) entitled, by
virtue of the fifth amendment, to a judgment against the United States
for the reasonable value of his service plus reimbursement for the
expenses incurred. Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore.
1964) rev'd on appeal - F.2d -, 33 L.W. 2673 (9th Cir. 1965). Cf.
Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Contra, Nabb v.
United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 173 (1864).
25 The question is ambiguous not only because of mixing the "duty"
aspect of a lawyer's aid to the poor, but also because "adequacy" itself depends upon a variety of factors which the question did not posit.
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A selected group of appointed counsel were asked whether
they considered the present system "fair to the lawyers" and what
changes they would recommend. Twenty-two appointed counsel
answered the questionnaire, and they split evenly over whether
the system was fair to counsel. But four who considered the
system "fair" and ten of the eleven who considered the system
"unfair" would change the system by paying "lawyers more for
their service."
Appointed counsel were asked what fee they would have
charged "a client who retained. . . [them] for ... services in...
[the] case." Excluding the two homicide cases, sixteen attorneys
answered, and the average fee for these cases would have been
529 dollars. If we assume that each attorney received the maximum permitted under the statute (i.e., 300 dollars), these attorneys gratuitously contributed a considerable part of their labor.
Personal interviews with judges in four districts indicated that
they seldom awarded the full 300 dollars except where there was
a trial. An attorney appointed in one of the homicide cases reported that he would have charged 3500 dollars if retained; counsel in the other homicide case reported he would have charged
two or three times what he was awarded.
The law recently enacted (L.B. 839) provides that in all cases
(not just in cases of homicide) the court "shall fix reasonable
fees." Assuming that administration under this language results
in appointed counsel receiving the same fee they would have received if retained for the case, then we will have adopted a state
policy of placing upon the taxpaying public the financial burden
of counsel for indigents. This is not to say, however, that the
attorney who is appointed will not suffer financially; he may,
for example, be forced to turn down more remunerative employment in order to serve as appointed counsel. This sacrifice is
not something which may be conveniently measured and considered in awarding compensation. This law should eliminate
many of the objections to the present Nebraska appointive system
previously noted.
Two counties in Nebraska employ a public defender to represent indigents, 26 and any county in Nebraska might do so "upon
approval of the county board."27 The Foundation survey revealed
nothing critical of the quality of the representation by public
defenders. In fact, all of the persons questioned either approved
26
27

Douglas and Scottsbluff.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1804 (Reissue 1964).
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or praised this method of counseling indigents. Nationwide, there
are 109 defender offices serving 171 counties. Nationwide, the
opinion of most judges and county attorneys was that public defenders were as "able as assigned counsel and . . . often more experienced, '28 and that public defenders generally compare favorably with prosecutors in "experience and ability." Regrettably,
the Criminal Justice Act does not utilize the public defender type
of service, although this was in the original proposal and may subsequently find its way into the federal law by way of future
29

amendment.

Focusing attention upon a more mundane aspect of the defender program, let's look at some cost figures. The American
Bar Foundation survey found that the cost of operating any
system (defender or assigned counsel) depends "more on the size
of the population being served than on the system that is chosen." 30 The following table compares the two systems:

28 PumaNAmRY SummARy, op. cit. supra note 23, at 15.
29 See REPORT, op. cit. supra note 22; REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's
CoAuvn= ox PovERT AND THE ADiISTRATION OF FEDERAL CnmWNAL
JUSTICE

146 (1963).

30 PRELIivxIARY SUmmARY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 19.
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Many persons questioned in the Nebraska phase of the Foundation survey felt that the county mentioned in their discussion
could not "afford" to adopt a public defender program because not
enough "business" existed to make it economically feasible. This
is obviously true, if we continue to think of the public defender
as an officer for a single county. Nebraska probation officers are
not county officers in the sense that their duties are restricted to
the boundaries of an individual county. 32 Nor is there any reason to restrict public defenders to individual counties. We should
think in terms of a public defender serving a wider geographical
area such as the present district court districts or maybe the entire state, exclusive of Douglas and Lancaster Counties.
Even if public lethargy or tradition or some reasoned or unreasoned premise demands that we have ninety-three counties,
each with a full slate of government officials such as county
attorney, sheriff, and judge, there is still no reason to apply
an unwieldy, expensive, and duplicative system to new government officers demanded by twentieth century conditions. Felony
punishments, including imposition of the death sentence, are not
carried out in county jails by county officials, and have not been
for many years. The burden of representing the state in criminal
cases shifts to a state officer once the trial phase is concluded,
and frequently "special prosecutors" assist the county attorney in
prosecuting difficult or important cases. State officials often aid
in the collection of evidence and preparation of the prosecution's
case. Nothing but a blind failure or refusal to apply common
sense to the solution of this "can't afford" problem prevents the
inventiveness and ingenuity of the twentieth century body politic
from creating public defender services for a state with population
distributions like those in Nebraska.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE TYPE AND STAGE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS
A.

BEFORE AND DURING TRIAL

Before L.B. 839 became law, counsel was provided felony
indigents in Nebraska after an information was filed, but before
arraignment. Appointing counsel at no earlier stage than this,
under some circumstances, does not satisfy the demands of the
United States Constitution. Thus, if the preliminary hearing is, or
may be, a critical stage of the proceeding, counsel at that stage is

82

See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2227 (Reissue 1964).
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constitutionally required.3 3 And confessions of persons denied
counsel may not be admitted at their trials without violating the
United States Constitution if procured after "the process shifts
from investigatory to accusatory. .... -. 4
The Foundation survey asked several questions of judges,
county attorneys, and appointed counsel dealing with the time
of appointment. Appointed counsel were asked whether their
appointment came "in time to represent the accused person adequately." Twenty answers were received: seventeen said "yes";
two said "no"; and one stated he would have "preferred" to have
been appointed earlier. Sixteen would change the present Nebraska system to require appointment earlier. Seven identified
the earlier time as "prior to the preliminary hearing"; four as
"before arraignment upon the warrant"; one as the "first appearance before a judge"; and one as "immediately."
The state district judges and the state's county attorneys
were asked what time an appointment would be made in an "ideal
system." The following table shows their opinions.
TABLE II
"IDEAL" STAGE FOR APPOINTMENT
Between Arrest and First Appearance
Before a Magistrate
At First Appearance Before a Magistrate
Between First Appearance and
Preliminary Hearing
At Preliminary Hearing
After Preliminary Hearing but Before the
Filing of an Information
After Filing the Information but Before
Arraignment (Present State Law Stage)
At Arraignment on Information
After Arraignment
At Trial
Totals

Judges

County
Attorneys

4
2

23
13

3
1

7
4

0

2

7
2
0
0

8
7
0
0

19

64

As this table shows, just a little over half the judges (ten out
of nineteen answering) defined an "ideal system" to be one pro83White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); State v. Snell, 177 Neb. 396,
128 N.W.2d 823 (1964).
84 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
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viding counsel earlier than under the then existing state law.
Four of the ten deemed the lack of an earlier appointment "unfair"; three considered it unfair "sometimes"; and three did not
view the lack of earlier appointment unfair.
Likewise, the table shows that seventy-six per cent of the
county attorneys (forty-nine out of sixty-four) described an
"ideal" system as one providing counsel at an earlier stage than
then given by Nebraska law. Twenty-one of the forty-nine
deemed the lack of earlier appointment unfair; nine thought it was
sometimes; and fifteen did not think the lack of earlier appointment unfair.
The Criminal Justice Act provides for appointment by a
United States Commissioner, and L.B. 839 provides that when an
indigent accused of felony files with a "magistrate an affidavit of
his inability to procure counsel, the magistrate shall forthwith
certify that fact to the district court . . . [and the] district judge
shall forthwith appoint an attorney . . .to represent the accused
...before the magistrate . . . ." Under these provisions counsel
is provided before a preliminary hearing. This is a long needed
change at the state level, and, as seen above, meets with the approval of a great many judges and county attorneys presently
serving.
There is no Nebraska statute, or proposal, which grants
counsel earlier than the preliminary hearing stage. A provision
in state law authorizing appointment of counsel to represent a
person "in the police station," after the suspect passes under the
protection of the Escobedo ruling, would seem futile from the
police standpoint, because the appointed lawyer would most certainly call a halt to the interrogation by advising his client to say
nothing, and Escobedo probably adequately protects the suspect
by ruling inadmissible evidence procured by the police, although
many issues about the adequacy of the protection remain to be
litigated.35 What is needed here is not so much an earlier counsel
appointment, but some enforcement teeth put in our present rule
that persons in custody "be brought before the magistrate . .. as

the admissibility of evidence discovered by following leads secured
in a police station in violation of Escobedo will soon appear, as well
as the scope of protection, if any, Escobedo gives to a defendant whose
conviction rests upon evidence secured by the police through inter-

35 E.g.,

rogating, unconstitutionally, a third person.

Certainly Escobedo pro-

tects indigents who do not have counsel they can identify, as well as
affluent criminals with counsel on retainers.
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soon as is practical under the existing circumstances. ' 36 As pointed
out in an article in this Review, the first appearance before a
magistrate, and hence the date of appointment of counsel, can be
purposefully delayed, unless there is some disadvantage attached
to the practice.37 We have judicial recognition.of Nebraska cases
with eight days and twenty-five days elapsing before the defendant was produced for his preliminary hearing, 38 and the Foundation study turned up one case where a defendant spent 103 days
in a county jail after his first appearance before a magistrate and
before counsel was appointed.
The extra burden imposed upon the lawyer by appointment
for the preliminary hearing will be light if history is any indication of the frequency with which full-dress preliminary hearings
are held in this state. County attorneys in five counties, Douglas,
Lancaster, Dodge, Hall, and Cheyenne, questioned personally about
the frequency of preliminary hearings in felony cases, gave the
following estimates:
TABLE I
FREQUENCY OF PRELIMINARY HEARINGS (FELONIES)
COUNTY ATTORNEY INTERVIEW
Cases where Punishment
Might be Capital
Other Felony Cases
Douglas
Lancaster
Dodge
Hall
Cheyenne

Usually
Held in
Usually
Usually
Usually

Held
Some
Held
Held
Held

Held in a Few
Held in Very Few
Held in Quite a Few
Not Usually Held
Held in a Few

A selective sampling of the dockets in three counties, for the
year 1962, showed the following:

86

87

State v. O'Kelly, 175 Neb. 798, 812, 124 N.W.2d 211, 219 (1963); cf.
Nna. REv. STAT. § 29-504 (Reissue 1964).,
Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States, A Study in Faith and Hope, 42
NEj. L. REV. 483, 609 (1963).

38

Gallegos v. State, 152 Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950) (25 days); Maher
v. State, 144 Neb. 463, 13 N.W.2d 641 (1944) (8 days).
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TABLE IV
FREQUENCY OF PRELIMINARY HEARINGS (FELONIES)
DOCKET STUDY
County

No Hearing Held
Hearing Held
Total
Sample Number Per cent Number Per cent

No Data
Number Per cent

Douglas

93

12

17

60

83

21

23

Lancaster
Dodge

44
20

0
7

0
44

33
9

100
56

11
4

25
20

Weighted averages for these three counties were: preliminary
hearings held in twenty-one per cent; preliminary hearing not
held in seventy-nine per cent.
The burden upon counsel, regardless of the stage of the appointment, is affected by two other factors: (1) the frequency
of waiver of counsel; and (2) the extensiveness of the representation.
The district judges of Nebraska varied in their estimate of the
per cent of waiver from ten per cent to ninety-five per cent. The
median estimate was seventy-five per cent. The mean given by
the county attorneys was fifty per cent, with estimates ranging
from zero to one hundred per cent. This waiver rate appears to
be well within national statistics, although there are great differences from state to state and even from judge to judge upon
the same court3 9 The incidence of waiver is closely tied to the
manner in which the defendant is told that he has a right to
counsel. Fortunately, both the Criminal Justice Act and L.B. 839
his right to counsel
require that the defendant be informed 4that
0
includes representation at public expense.
The Foundation survey of three counties, for 1962, showed the
following disposition of felony cases:

39 PRELIMINARY SUMMARY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 28-30; SILvERsTEaN,
DEFENSE OF ME POOR 32 (1965).

40 Information that an accused is "entitled to counsel" or has a "right to

a lawyer" may be interpreted by the accused to mean that he may
employ counsel, and the Foundation survey found that in some instances defendants understood the word "counsel" to mean a "sort of
adviser like a family counsellor."

supra note 23, at 29.

PRE imiNARY

SuMMARY,

op. cit.
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TABLE V
DISPOSITION OF FELONY CASES, 1962
County

Total

Sample

Plea:

Guilty

Plea:

Lesser

Offense

Trial:

Found

Trial:

Dismissed Guilty Acquitted Other

4
4
Douglas
93
60
11
10
4
Lancaster
44
39
0
3
1
0
1
Dodge
20
13
4
2
0
0
1
For these three counties, seventy-one per cent (weighted average) of the
felony cases ended in guilty pleas.
Thus, representation in a great many cases does not require
defending the accused at a trial.

B. AFTER TRIAL AND CONVICTION
As we have noted, prior to L.B. 839 Nebraska statutory law
drew a distinction between capital and noncapital cases insofar as
the right to counsel at public expense for direct review purposes
is concerned. Under L.B. 839 this is no longer true and counsel
is provided at public expense in all felony cases "for all proceedings before the magistrate, in the district court, and in the Supreme Court . . . ." The district court will establish a "reasonable" fee for "services performed." This will include payment for
4
services in connection with a review in the state supreme court. '
If the felony defendant desires to pursue his case beyond the
highest court in the state, either by appeal or certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court, the right to counsel at public expense will have to be found in some federal law or federal court
rule. The Criminal Justice Act does not appear to cover this,
although it does not expressly exclude it either, and it seems that
the intricacies of United States Supreme Court practice and the
importance of careful draftsmanship, whether the proper filing
be a jurisdictional statement or a petition for certiorari, should
require the appointment of counsel. As a practical matter, the
accused's need for counsel at this stage seems just as great as the
need for counsel after jurisdiction has been noted or certiorari
granted. 42
4' Under Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), counsel for appeals
to the Nebraska Supreme Court by indigent Nebraska felons would
be constitutionally required.
42 M&. Gideon drafted and filed his Petition for Certiorari and his Reply
to the Response of Florida Opposing Certiorari without the aid of

counsel. The Supreme Court of the United States appointed counsel
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Any time a state-convicted felon's proper remedy is in the
federal court by way of habeas corpus, then his right to counsel
for Mr. Gideon only after certiorari was granted; the clerk had suggested in a letter to Gideon that upon request the Court would appoint
a lawyer, and Gideon "moved" that this be done. Mr. Gideon, unrepresented, failed to include the required poverty affidavit in his
first certiorari petition, but did better after the clerk "enclosed a copy
of the rules and a sample affidavit to help him ....
"
See LEWIS,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 6, 46, 48.
Drafting and filing a "Petition for Certiorari" (or papers seeking
review by way of "appeal") is an area where the skill of competent
counsel is vital, particularly in view of time limits which are jurisdictional, and the proper phrasing of questions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 2101(c)-(d) (1958); U.S. Sup. CT. R. 22, 53(5); STERN AND GRESSMAN,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 6-1, at 201-02 (3d ed. 1962); DahnkeWalker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
In one indigent criminal case, the author unsuccessfully sought to
obtain from a United States Circuit Justice an appointment of counsel
to assist the prisoner in preparing his certiorari petition, but the
Justice took no action. In later years, others have been no more successful in getting a state court to appoint counsel for the preparation
of the petition for certiorari. See United States ex rel. Coleman v.
Denno, 313 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1963).
Anyone who, like the author, has read a couple of term's output
of in forma pauperis petitions for certiorari can attest to the fact that
counsel would be of immense service to prisoner and court alike in
stating issues in understandable fashion, because as Justice Frankfurter has said, they are "almost unintelligible and certainly do not
present a clear statement of issues necessary for our understanding."
LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 33.
United States Supreme Court Rules provide for reimbursing the
appointed "to the extent of first-class transportation from . . . [the
attorney's] home to Washington and return . . . ." (Rule 53 (7)).
Almost every week the Supreme Court sits, scores of attorneys are
admitted to its bar, and the "duty to the court" argument seems
sufficient base upon which to predicate appointing some of these

"certificate-holders" to aid prisoners struggling to draft papers for
carrying their cases to the highest court in the land. If the "duty"
argument will not go this far, then the Criminal Justice Act principle
of paid counsel should be applied, in order that we no longer have a
prisoner denied counsel for drafting technical papers for filing with
the Court which, through the years, has carefully outlined the right
to counsel in all the other courts in the land.
Admittedly the problem of providing counsel for the drafting and
filing of documents is a problem in both state and federal courts.
The drafting and filing stage is crucial, and if the right to counsel
(whether granted by the fourteenth amendment or the sixth amendment) includes the right to effective assistance at all stages of the
proceedings, counsel should be provided indigents in many instances
where, today, the indigent must depend upon his own resources of
intellect, or upon the advice of cellmates or fellow jail dwellers.
There are signs that the right to counsel will soon include aid in the
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will have to be found in federal law. 43 However, if the defendant's remedy is some state post-conviction procedure, then his right
to counsel in these will depend, in the first instance, upon state
law. Nebraska procedure now offers three different post-conviction remedies: Habeas corpus, coram nobis, and a new statutory
remedy provided by L.B. 836.4 4

As previously noted, the latter

contains an explicit guarantee of public-compensated counsel at
the district court level, and probably also for purposes of appealing
any adverse ruling of the district court to the Nebraska Supreme
preparation of papers and the filing of legal documents. In Chase v.

Page, 343 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1965) a state prisoner successfully contended that constitutional rights are violated where an indigent fails
to secure an appellate review of his conviction because a pro se filing

did not meet state law requirements. The prisoner secured the defective paper as follows: "[I] went out to the yard and found a
guy that knew how to make up a pauper's oath and he said he would
make me one up, and he gave it to me, two or three days later, and
I filed it ....

43

44

"

343 F.2d at 169.

Interestingly enough, and this

points up the commonness of the problem to both branches of our
dual system of courts, both prisoner Chase and Clarence Gideon
stumbled over the proper drafting and filing of a pauper's oath.
The right to counsel in federal habeas corpus cases is omitted from
the Criminal Justice Act. Whether there is a constitutional requirement that counsel be appointed is uncertain. Lower federal courts,
like Nebraska state courts, have denied counsel upon the argument
that habeas corpus is a "civil remedy." See Barker v. Ohio, 330 F.2d
594 (6th Cir. 1964) (citing many cases); Carpenter v. Gladden, 223
F. Supp. 612 (D. Ore. 1963); cf. United States ex rel. Marshall v.
Wilkins, 338 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1964): "Because habeas corpus is
nominally civil in nature, the Sixth Amendment does not apply. But
this and other courts have held that sound discretion, perhaps deriving
from the Fifth Amendment, requires that counsel be appointed for
petitioners, at least in some cases." Id. at 406. However, language in
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712-14 (1961) indicates that the United
States Supreme Court will not be content to deny counsel because the
proceeding is labeled "civil" for solution: of some other legal 'issue.
Thus, in the Smith case the Court held unconstitutional, as denying a
prisoner equal protection of the law, an Iowa statute requiring an
indigent to pay a $4.00 filing fee before an application for habeas
corpus would be docketed and decided. The opinion characterized
habeas corpus as the "freedom writ" and as the "highest safeguard of
liberty" and stated: "The availability of a procedure to regain liberty
lost through criminal process cannot be made contingent upon a
choice of labels." Id. at 712. See SoKoL, FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPUS § 31
(1965).
See NEB. R-v. STAT. §§ 29-2801 to -2824 (Reissue 1964) (habeas corpus);
Hawk v. State, 151 Neb. 717, 39 N.W.2d 561 (1949) (coram nobis);
Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb. 84, 261 N.W. 339 (1935); Newcomb v. State,
129 Neb. 69, 261 N.W. 348 (1935); State v. Boyd, 117 Neb. 320, 220
N.W. 281 (1928); L.B. 836, 75th Neb. Leg. Sess. (April 12, 1965).
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Court. But at the same time that we provide counsel for this
species of post-conviction litigation, we deny an indigent counsel
for either of the other two proceedings, coram nobis and habeas
corpus. The lack of counsel in habeas corpus and in coram nobis
cases certainly runs the gravest of risks that such refusal conflicts
with the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 45 And aside from the question of federal constitutional
compulsion, it seems pertinent to ask: Why is it good policy, fair
to indigents, and not unduly burdensome to the public to provide
counsel at public expense to represent a person seeking to test
the validity of his incarceration by way of the procedure established by L.B. 836, and fail to provide similar representation for
cases brought by way of coram nobis or habeas corpus?
Counsel in habeas corpus cases would be provided in an
"ideal" legal system by sixty-five per cent of the fifty-eight county
attorneys registering their opinions in the Foundation survey; and
by fifty per cent of eighteen judges surveyed. Table VI, which
follows, shows that a large percentage of the judges and county
attorneys also deemed the failure to provide counsel "unfair."
TABLE VI
WOULD "IDEAL" SYSTEM PROVIDE COUN-

WOULD LACK OF

SEL IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS?

COUNSEL BE UNFAIR?

Judges
County
Attorneys

Yes

No

Sometimes

Yes

No

9

7

2

8

8

1

38

20

0

29

20

0

Sometimes

The shibboleth that habeas corpus, and probably coram nobis,
is a "civil remedy" and that counsel is not required in "civil cases"
possesses little persuasiveness when the Great Writ is employed to
test the validity of a man's confinement and is drained of even
that vestige of support by the provision in the new post-conviction
act that: "Proceedings under the provisions of this act shall be
civil in nature. '46 It would seem that what is good policy sauce
45

46

La Faver v. Turner, 231 F. Supp. 895 (D. Utah 1964); cf. Lane v.
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961);

see note 43 supra.
In La Faver v. Turner, supra note 45, the clerk of the Supreme Court
of Utah informed a prisoner seeking court-appointed counsel to appeal
his state court denial of an application for habeas corpus to the Utah
Supreme Court: "'[Inasmuch as this appeal is from a denial of a
writ of habeas corpus, it is a civil case and there is no obligation for
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for the goose should serve likewise for the gander, and that counsel should be provided for habeas corpus and coram nobis applicants by statute.
The Nebraska Supreme Court had occasion recently to comment upon its ability to perceive the issues and understand the
argument of a prisoner who briefed and argued pro se his appeal
from a district court order dismissing his application for a writ of
habeas corpus:
It may be stated that the petition and the argument of the
plaintiff is itself vague and difficult to follow, probably because
he is not a lawyer.
We have endeavored, however, to ascertain
his contentions. 47
The appointment of counsel for habeas corpus (and coram nobis) applicants would render such "endeavoring" unnecessary and
be a great aid to the court in its desire to deal fairly with the
issues raised. It seems preferable, too, to handle this matter of
state criminal law at the state level rather than to delay until
the command for counsel appears in federal court pronouncements.
The provision for counsel under L.B. 836 ambiguously reads
as follows:
The district court may appoint an attorney .. .to represent
the prisoners in all proceedings under the provisions of this
act .... 48

What remains unclear is whether counsel may be appointed to
assist the prisoner in drafting and filing his "verified motion," or
whether the prisoner must- muddle through this stage of the procedure unrepresented and secure counsel only after he has successfully negotiated the drafting and filing himself. Advice and
appointment of counsel except in appeals in criminal cases."'

Supp. at 898. The district court answered:

47
48

231 F.

"The blanket application

, * .of the proposition that ... counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding, being a 'civil case' is not necessary . . . [impinges the] constitutional rights of the petitioner." 231 F. Supp. at 898-99. See also
note 43 supra.
The exact meaning of the provision "proceedings under the provisions of this act shall be civil in nature" is obscure. It could cover
many issues, including such items as: Right to confront witness; procedure to be applied; weight and location of burden of proof; liability
for costs; and many more. Such ambiguous draftsmanship is extremely
unwise from many standpoints.
Case v. State, 177 Neb. 774, 775-76, 131 N.W.2d 191, 191-92 (1964),
vacated and remanded, 85 Sup. Ct. 1486 (1965).
L.B. 836, § 4, 75th Neb. Leg. Sess. (April 12, 1965). (Emphasis added.)
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legal skill at the drafting and filing stage seems most critical in
view of the fact that the procedure under L.B. 836 "is cumulative
and is not intended to be concurrent with any other remedy existing in the courts of this state" and the provision that "the court
need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for
similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." 49 Hopefully this
will not be interpreted to empower a district court to deny counsel the right to amend the "verified motion" after he has been
appointed.
If the appointed attorney resides close to the court which
sentenced the defendant (and this would likely be true), then the
attorney often may reside hundreds of miles from his client, thus
making consultation and interviewing difficult from a practical
standpoint. Whether the appointed attorney will be paid from
public funds for his time and expenses to travel to the penal complex to talk with his client is not resolved. If such time and
expenses are not compensable, then the provision in the act empowering the district court to "entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner, whether
or not a hearing is held" seems unfair and maybe even unconstitutional by fettering the prisoner's right to consult with his
attorney. 50
49

Although not directly related to the right to counsel, one more obser-

vation should be made about the wisdom of the provision that the
new remedy is "cumulative and . . . not . . . concurrent" with other
Nebraska post-conviction remedies. For many years, Nebraska crimminal procedure has been vexed by doubts about the scope of habeas
corpus and coram nobis. Sixteen years ago the Nebraska Law Review
noted that "even the legal profession finds it difficult to discover
which is the proper remedy in many cases." Note, The Judicial
Obstacle Course, 29 NEB. L. REV. 445, 449 (1950). The Note suggested
that the state needed "an express and simple post-conviction procedure." Id. at 450. (Emphasis added.) Now, sixteen years later, we
finally have a post-conviction act, but whether it is "simple" in view
of its requirement that it apply only where habeas corpus and coram
nobis will not lie is doubtful. The disaster of choosing the wrong writ,
which disappeared in many places with the adoption of modern civil
procedures, is perpetuated in an area where we should not be emphasizing procedural niceties, but instead reaching the merits of the
constitutional grievance as soon as possible. The only safe and economical way for Nebraska prisoners to exhaust their state remedies
is to file three proceedings concurrently, all alleging the same grievance: One labeled "habeas corpus" with the district court of the
district where the applicant is held in custody, one labeled "coram
nobis", and one labeled "new post-conviction remedy," the latter two
being filed in the district where the applicant was convicted.
50 We should also note that since the sixth amendment's right to be
confronted with the witness against the accused is applicable to state
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Lastly we should notice the issue of counsel for misdemeanants. That is, apart from the scope of Gideon, should counsel be
appointed to represent indigents charged with crimes less than
felonies? The Criminal Justice Act provides compensated counsel
in "every criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a
felony, or a misdemeanor, other than a petty offense," although
the maximum compensation in misdemeanor cases is 300 dollars, not
the 500 dollar figure which is applicable for felony representation.
Counsel for indigent misdemeanants is not provided by any
present, or proposed, Nebraska law or court decision. Possibly a
few are represented by the public defender in Douglas County,
but this is on a selective basis. Across the nation "counsel is not
usually provided in misdemeanor cases." 51 There are some variations in this practice from state to state, and even within states.
Nebraska county attorneys and judges were quizzed about
whether an "ideal" system would provide counsel for misdemeanor
cases. The tabulation of responses follows:
TABLE VII
COUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANOR CASES
IS IT UNFAIR TO
DEFENDANT IF COUNSEL
IS NOT FURNISHED?

"IDEAL" SYSTEM
Would
Provide

Judges

Would not Sometimes
Provide Would Provide

No

Sometimes

2

17

1

1

16

1

11

43

1

7

39

3

County
Attorneys

Yes

Handling the misdemeanor problem is a most difficult matter,
even excluding issues concerning the scope of constitutional compulsion under Gideon. Quite frequently Nebraskans responding to
the Foundation survey stated that there should be "some" representation for indigent misdemeanants, but when pressed to define
the need in definite terms they were forced to resort to suggestions
such as: "in serious cases," "in juvenile cases," in "special cases,"
"when there is a need in order to do justice," or "if the defendant

51

proceedings (Pointer v. Texas, 85 Sup. Ct 1065 (1965); Douglas v.
Alabama, 85 Sup. Ct. 1074 (1965) ), a hearing which'proceeds in the
absence of the prisoner may well be unconstitutional in this regard,
too.
PRELnoNARY SumMARY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 36; SIVERSTEIN,
DFENsE OF TM POOR 123-35 (1965).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, NO. 4
demands it and is not able to defend himself." One suggested
that counsel should be provided if a jail sentence is imposed, but
obviously this is not practical because the right to trial counsel
cannot turn upon the sentence imposed after conviction. The
scope of the problem also is staggering for, while we have
300,000 persons in the United States charged annually with state
52
felonies, we have 4,500,000 persons charged with misdemeanors.
Assuming that the magnitude of the problem is affected only by
the number of defendants, the financial burden of counsel for
indigent misdemeanants becomes so large that no one can criticize
the failure of a statute to provide blanket coverage for all misdemeanors at the present time.
ADEQUACY OF DEFENSE AND COMPETENT COUNSEL
Many convicted defendants consider the adequacy of their
defense and the competency of their counsel to be synonomous.
Their facile reasoning frequently concludes that their defense
failed to persuade a judge or jury because their advocate was
incompetent. No doubt we could fill a thousand pages documenting instances where defendants, after conviction, turned
upon their attorneys-particularly where counsel was court-appointed, and in this sense "provided" rather than "selected"and sought freedom or a new trial by alleging their confinement
resulted from "incompetent counsel." 53 No attorney enjoys being
attacked in this fashion, even by attackers. of such ilk as convicted
felons, and fear of this unpleasantness plays some role in the
reluctance of attorneys to look with favor upon court appointments. But notwithstanding the fallacious reasoning of convicted
persons, there is a difference between an "adequate" defense and
"competent" counsel, although of course the two ideas are related.
The adequacy of a fair opportunity to meet the challenge of
a criminal charge may be impeded in many ways even though
the accused is represented by the most zealous and competent
defense counsel in the country. If counsel for the accused is
appointed, or employed, too late to prepare a defense; if counsel
lacks funds for "investigative, expert, or other services necessary
52

53

PREFnViqARy SUMMARY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 35-36.
See, e.g., Miller v. Hudspeth, 176 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949); Fellman,
The Federal Right to Counsel in State Courts, 31 NEB. L. REV. 15, 52-54
(1951). One attorney interviewed in the Foundation survey told of
receiving in the mail from an inmate of the penal complex an item of
wearing apparel commonly associated with locomotive engineers, evidently symbolic of the inmate's opinion that the attorney, the inmate's
own defense counsel, had "engineered" his trip to the complex.
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to an adequate defense; '54 or if vital evidence or witnesses are
unavailable for a variety of reasons; the defense may still fail to
meet the standard of "adequate."-55 If the events, circumstances,
or occurrences which hinder making an adequate defense in the
foregoing sense are foreseeable and remediable by societal action
through legislation or court action, there is a grave risk that the
failure to foresee and remedy will result in an unconstitutional
conviction. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, as pointed out in
Mr. Kutak's article, provides for "reasonable compensation" for
"services other than counsel." On the other hand, existing Nebraska law does not mention public coverage of a defendant's
expenses for services other than counsel. Nor does L.B. 839 expressly provide for such payment. Thus, it is appropriate to
inquire whether indigents are, or will be, provided these services
in Nebraska.
Nineteen attorneys assigned to represent indigents in 1962 in
five Nebraska counties were asked the following question in the
Foundation survey: Were you repaid for your out-of-pocket expenses? Six answered "no"; twelve answered "yes"; one reported
he "did not have any."
No pattern existed within a county. For example, in Lancaster and Dodge counties some attorneys were paid their expenses and some were not. Likewise, there seemed to be no
pattern judged by the crimes involved. One attorney appointed
to defend an accused murderer was reimbursed for his expenses
-another attorney appointed to defend a person similarly charged
was not. The author knows of other instances in the state where
appointed counsel were reimbursed for part, or all, of their investigation expenses. Thus, from the Foundation survey, and other
information, it is evident that sometimes appointed counsel have
been paid part, or all, of the expenses incurred in investigation
and preparation, and that this has occurred without the aid of a
statute expressly authorizing such reimbursements. Such expenses have been subsumed under the statutory language of secCriminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C.A. § S006A(e) (1964).
15 "The appointed lawyer must be armed with means to undertake adequate pre-trial preparation and investigation if witnesses are to be
discovered, scientific aids and testimony utilized, and cross examination effectively conducted." REPORT Or THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COM54

mTTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINSTRATION

JusTIcE 12 (1963).

Or FEDERAL CRMINAL

See EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED, REPORT OF
A SPECIAL CovnvIITTEE or mE AssocIATION or =H BAR OF THE CITY Or
NEW YoRx AND THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AssocIATiwON 58-60 (1959).
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tion 29-1803, allowing public payment of an "account, bill or
claim . . . presented by an attorney . . . for . . . services . ... "
L.B. 839 makes no specific provision for reimbursement for
investigation or preparation expenses, and it refers to the sum to
be received by the attorney as a "fee for services performed" and
as an "account, bill or claim . . . for services performed ....
"
Since this language is so much like that of section 29-1803, district
judges should continue to possess power under the new statute to
award sums for investigation and other expenses.
Several arguments support handling this matter in the manner
employed by the Criminal Justice Act-that is, by expressly authorizing such expenditures. First, it assures uniform handling
of the matter for all defendants, and in all state courts, and
eliminates the patchwork of practice which varies from defendant
to defendant, from judge to judge, and from court to court within
the state. Second, it provides some guidelines for lawyers and
judges to define what expenditures would be paid from public
funds. The Criminal Justice Act has three built-in protections
against unreasonable defense expenditures. First, the statute
requires that the services be "necessary to an adequate defense."
Second, the statute ordinarily requires court authorization as a
prerequisite to public financial contribution. Finally, the statute
directs that the compensation for "services" (as distinguished from
"reimbursement" for expenses) shall be judicially established as
"reasonable" and subject to a 300 dollar ceiling. The ceiling seems
unduly restrictive, because the requirement that the compensation
for services shall be "reasonable" adequately protects public funds.
Elimination of the ceiling on compensation for "services" likewise
would render unnecessary any fine distinction concerning what
constitutes a "service rendered" and what is an "expense incurred." 56
Any scheme to reimburse investigative expenses, whether it
be a statute expressly providing for their payment as under the
Criminal Justice Act or the current Nebraska method which
leaves the issue to judges for decision without statutory aid,
faces an important issue of administration in segregating those
expenses which are "necessary" from those which are "unnecessary" for an adequate defense. The Criminal Justice Act is too
new to throw light on what federal judges think is "necessary"
56

The Criminal Justice Act, in providing reimbursement for the attorney's expenses plus a fee with a ceiling ($500 in felony cases), will
require some fine distinctions, too, as to what expenses are "covered"
in a fee payment. See RFPORT, op. cit. supra note 22.
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for an adequate defense. Some Nebraska cases have come to the
author's attention, outside the Foundation survey, where Nebraska
state judges made the issue of reimbursement turn on whether
any evidence usable to the defendant was secured by the expenditure, or, in other instances, whether the defense actually
used at the trial evidence secured by the expenditure. Such a
test is unrealistic and unduly restrictive. It encourages trial counsel to explore only those avenues of inquiry which he can foresee
will prove fruitful, when every attorney knows that a good lawyerlike job of investigation often entails turning many stones,
some yielding nothing usable for the defense. Likewise, perfectly
legal defense strategy may be impeded by a rule which requires
evidence turned up in an investigation to be used before reimbursement will be forthcoming. Much more preferable would be a
rule which authorizes public payment for any investigation which
would be undertaken by a diligent attorney proceeding in a
lawyerlike way to prepare a defense for his client, and permits a
judge to approve the expense upon finding that the proposed
search-appeared to be reasonably necessary for this purpose.
Failure to provide these expenses from the public purse means
either (1) a grave risk that the conviction of an indigent
defendant denied these investigative expenses is unconstitutional
under the fourteenth amendment, 57 or (2) that his attorney will
furnish the funds for such investigation and thus subsidize the
adequate representation of an indigent.
Important as services other than counsel are to an adequate
defense, they are secondary to the fact that an adequate defense
rests primarily upon a single person, the defense counsel. Across
the country the evidence is mounting that the competency of
this key individual is becoming a matter of prime concern. Thus,
the public was recently admonished by Dean Griswold of the
Harvard Law School on nationwide television that all too frequently the lawyer appointed to represent an indigent -secures
the appointment because he has nothing else to do, and that the
appointee has nothing to do because paying clients judge him incompetent to represent them. Professor James Vorenberg, director of the newly formed Office of Criminal Justice, recently
.spoke as follows:
[T]he most basic problem ... is the vital need for improving the
quality of the criminal bar. Criminal law has too long been the
poor and not quite respectable cousin in the legal family; too many
57 The rationale of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), casts doubt upon

the validity of such .a conviction.
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criminal lawyers are the outcasts, the failures, the unscrupulous
and the incompetent of the legal world. Venal and self-seeking
practices, ignorance and neglect make mockeries of the rights
which itis the duty of the lawyer to protect. 58
Even if we discount these gloomy comments at a substantial
rate, they still admonish us to watch what is going on in the
day-to-day appointment of defense counsel. 59 Thus, a prime object of the Foundation survey of Nebraska representation of
indigents was to ascertain facts concerning the experience and
ability of the attorneys being appointed.
Twenty-two attorneys appointed in 1962 to represent indigents in four selected counties (Dodge, Hall, Lancaster and Cheyenne) were surveyed.
These appointees represented felons
charged with crimes ranging from assault to murder. Ten appointees had been admitted to the bar nine years or less; eleven
had been admitted ten years or more. One appointee who defended a charge of carrying a concealed weapon had been admitted only one year; two appointees (one in a forgery case and
the other in an assault case) had been admitted two years. On
the other hand, the three lawyers appointed to represent two persons charged with murder and one charged with rape were each
at least ten-year veterans of the practice of law. Every appointee
had handled at least one criminal case prior to his appointment;
ten had handled three or more criminal cases before their appointment. This would indicate that Nebraska appointments are
not as subject to the criticism that the appointees are "often
young attorneys who lack experience in criminal law" 60 as is true
in other states surveyed in the Foundation project.
Length of time at the bar and involvement in prior criminal
cases are not guarantees, nor sometimes maybe even very good
gauges, of the competency of appointees. In this age of rapidly
changing precedent, particularly at the federal constitutional level,
and the enactment of hundreds of laws with each session of the
legislatures, competency depends not only upon experience and
age, but upon counsel's desire and ability to keep pace with
change. The Foundation survey in Nebraska sought the opinions
58 Address by Professor James Vorenberg, Director of the Office of

Criminal Justice, Governor's Conference on Bail and the Right to
Counsel, Jan. 23, 1965, in Harv. L.S. Bull., March 1965, p. 5,7. See
also Time, June 11, 1965, p. 60.

59 See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant,
78 HARv. L. REV. 1434 (1965); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel,
49 VA.L. REV. 1531 (1963).
60 PRELnVINARY SmvnvARy, op. cit. supra note 23, at 7.

THE ECHO OF CLARENCE GIDEON'S TRUMPET

777

of the judges of the state district courts about how appointees
compared in experience and ability with retained defense counsel
and with the county attorney. And all the state's county attorneys were asked their opinions about the experience and ability
of appointed counsel as compared to retained counsel.
Sixteen judicial replies compared appointed counsel with retained counsel. Eleven rated them as "equal"; one "about equal";
two as "favorable"; one as "O.K."; and one stated appointed counsel were "not as experienced." Seventeen judicial replies compared the appointees with the county attorney. Ten considered
them "equal"; one stated the comparison was "O.K."; one rated
the appointees "equal or better"; three rated the appointees as
"better" or "more able" than the county attorney; one rated the
appointees "not as good"; and one ranked the county attorney as
"better." The value of a comparison between the county attorney
and appointees to test the ability of the latter may prove little
in view of the comment by one judge that his appointments were
"superior to the district attorney. . . [and that the] district attorney is usually the least able member of the bar," and several other
judicial comments that the county attorney was usually "young"
and often "not too experienced in criminal law."
Fifty-one county attorneys rated the appointed counsel against
retained counsel. Forty-two rated them as "equal" in ability and
experience and one rated appointees as "equal or better." Three
rated appointed counsel as better and a like number considered
appointed counsel "not equal." One county attorney stated that
the comparison "varied" and another that "sometimes" there was
equality. This evidence indicates that the Nebraska appointive
system is working fairly well.
Since the selection of the person for appointment rests with
the judge (and this is also true under the Criminal Justice Act),
he will play an important role in securing competent counsel.
Neither the Criminal Justice Act, the existing Nebraska statutory
law, nor the recently enacted L.B. 839 contains any provision
establishing a method of judicial selection. Suggested federal district court plans to implement the federal law use a panel of
"competent" attorneys, usually made up of names suggested by
legal aid agencies, bar associations, and the federal district
judges.8 1 To date, the judges of the state district courts have not
used this technique. The Foundation survey asked Nebraska

61 See some of the suggested plans in
Appendix 2.
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judges what system they employed to obtain attorneys for appointments. Fifteen replies were received. Eight judges stated
they used a "roster of all attorneys admitted to practice, subject
to exceptions for age, infirmity, state agency employment, etc."
Four replied they used "their own list" but did not explain how
they constructed the list. One judge stated that he needed no
lists because he knew every lawyer in his district personally.
Obviously, the method of selecting appointees will vary from
district to district within the state because of widely varying
conditions, particularly with regard to population.
The survey also showed that many state district judges are
aware of the desirability of spreading the workload over many
lawyers in order that the representation of indigents not burden a
few attorneys. Since L.B. 839 has eliminated the ceiling upon
the attorney's fee, the necessity of "passing the burden around"
may be eased somewhat. Although the survey did not turn up
any complaints on behalf of attorneys that they suffered under
a cumulative burden of federal and state appointments, this might
occur in counties where an unfortunate attorney, extremely competent and zealous in criminal defenses, would find his name upon
a federal "panel" and also a state judge's "list.162 Some federalstate cooperation in this regard, administered by a bar association
committee, might be a wise solution to this problem if it occurs.
State district judges have found very little difficulty in securing attorneys to serve by appointment. Thirteen answers stated
that no difficulty was encountered. Four reported they experienced some difficulty, especially in capital punishment cases. Six
replies listed "never" or "rare" in answer to the query: What per
cent ask to be excused? Five answered the same question with
figures less than ten per cent; three estimated the figure to be
between ten and twenty-nine per cent; and one judge set the
figure at between thirty and forty-nine per cent (if he included
capital punishment cases). The vast majority of judges who
answered the survey questionnaire excuse an attorney if he "has
a good reason." Several judges noted they considered it unfair
to the defendant to assign him counsel unwilling to serve; but one
judge stated he would not excuse a lawyer unless the case involved the possibility of capital punishment. Several judges
frankly admitted that, when they thought the excuse frivolous,
they had a "heart to heart" talk with the attorney asking to. be
62
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excused, "lectured" him on "his duty as an officer of the court,"
and if the lawyer then persisted in his request, either gave him
one more chance to serve in another case at a later date or
immediately made a mental note to pass over the attorney when
considering lawyers for jobs as "referees, etc." It is quite clear
that Nebraska judges do not look with favor upon requests to be
excused. This stern judicial attitude is commendable. Without
it the appointive system would no doubt flounder. 63
Appointments to represent those charged with heinous crimes
and to defend persons holding unpopular views remain troublesome, and several judges indicated problems in securing attorneys
to serve in these instances. Some of the reluctance of attorneys
to serve in these cases arises because they fear the attitude of the
general public toward their role in representing such clients.
Solid bar support of the duty to serve in such cases and education
of the general public in this regard would do much to eliminate
problems in this area. 64 If the crime charged involves a long
prison sentence or death as punishment, the survey showed Nebraska judges take more care in considering their appointments.
This extra care takes various forms, such as appointing two counsel or appointing more experienced, older, more "adequate," or
"more competent" counsel.6 5
CONCLUSION
Criticism and suggestions for additional improvements contained in the foregoing discussion cannot, and should not, obscure
the fact that progress has been made in the areas touched upon in
The judicial attitude also affects the "adequacy" or "competency" (in
short, the quality) of representation. By emphasizing the "duty to the
court" aspect of bar membership, judges buttress the attorney's devotion to his client's cause, and the end result is more careful investigation and preparation, both as to law and facts. This devotion is particularly important and in greater need of support in cases of criminal
defendants charged with crimes which arouse great public indignation.
See SACKS, DEFENDING TE UNPOPULAR CLIENT (1961).
64 Many bar associations publicly take stands strongly supporting the
right of an unpopular person charged with crime to have counsel, and
the duty of bar members to represent the charged individual with
skill and devotion. See SACKS, op. cit. supra note 63, at 24. While
we have few criminal cases in Nebraska of this type, some have
occurred in the past and the chance for the bar to educate the public
and support the appointee went unused.
-65 -The quoted words were those of Nebraska district court judges, and
their use demonstrates that the judges do not consider bar members
fungible.
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this article. Progress in the area of counsel for indigents has
been made on the state and federal levels, and the right to due
process and equal protection of the law are more meaningful
today than at any previous time in the history of the United
States. The Federal Criminal Justice Act, the enactment of L.B.
839 and L.B. 836 are shining examples compared to criminal
procedures a century ago. Chafe and dissatisfaction stem only
from the slowness of the pace of change, the incompleteness of
handling problems, and the source and strength of pressures
needed to generate changes. And maybe the evolutionary pace is
normal in view of the slowness of growth in law generally and
considering that, in the particular area under discussion, the individuals whose rights are involved cannot vote, have no organized
pressure group to sponsor their plaints, possess no funds to hire
advocates and draftsmen, and are considered by many to be entitled to less attention and resources than they now receive. 6
But one cannot help but regret that the pressure inducing
the changes has not generally emanated from the "grass roots,"
nor from the halls of the state legislatures or the offices of the
states' chief executives, nor usually, initially, from the conferences
and opinions of state judiciaries. It has come about primarily because of prodding from the Supreme Court of the United States,
and we might say to Nebraska, and some other states too, what
that Court said to our sister state, Iowa:
[I]t ... [ill-behooves] this great State, whose devotion to the
equality of rights is indelibly stamped upon its history, to say to

its indigent prisoners seeking to redress what they believe to be the
State's wrongs:

"Go to the federal court."67

It is time for Nebraska, and the other states, to tend to the
states' business of handling criminal matters with efficiency, dispatch, and fairness, and in keeping with the trend and tone of
decisions from Betts, through Gideon, and on to whatever lies
beyond Escobedo. It is time for Nebraska to secure these aims
by recognizing and extending the right to counsel beyond those
areas now covered and by ridding state criminal procedures of

66 See, e.g., the attitude of a newspaper on the issue of using public funds
to support a defender organization which at the time was defending
a person accused of shooting a policeman, in EQuAL JusTicE FOR THE
AccusED, op. cit. supra note 55, at 139, n.11: "It certainly should not
be a function of the Red Feather. Contributors to this laudable agency
of mercy don't give to help hoodlums like those who shot Officer
Connolly, even on the civil rights dodge."
67 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713 (1961).
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the uncertainties which mildly perplex lawyers, but entirely confound the unrepresented.
Very shortly after Nebraska became a state its lawmakers

designed a Great Seal for the new polity, and emblazed upon that
seal "in capital letters, the motto, 'EQUALITY BEFORE THE
LAW'." 68

Certainly those draftsmen who verbalized such a noble

ideal envisioned a more important future for it than serving
merely as the adornment of state papers, the subject of commencement addresses, and a concept to praise at Law Day observances. The concept has been growing. It remains for Nebraskans
to mature it to a point where Nebraska law "weighs the interests
of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and [extends] .
hand ... as far to each."6 9

68 Neb. Laws 1867, § 1, at 57; NiE.

.

. its

REV. STAT. § 84-501 (Reissue 1958).
69 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 714 (1961).
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